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We investigate limitations imposed by detector dead-times on the performance of sequential at-
tacks against a differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol with weak
coherent pulses. In particular, we analyze sequential attacks based on unambiguous state discrim-
ination of the signal states emitted by the source and we obtain ultimate upper bounds on the
maximal distance achievable by a DPS QKD scheme both in the so-called trusted and untrusted
device scenarios, respectively.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] is a technique
that allows two parties (usually called Alice and Bob)
to generate a secret key despite the computational and
technological power of an eavesdropper (Eve) who inter-
feres with the signals. Together with the Vernam cipher
[2], QKD can be used for unconditionally secure data
transmission.
The first complete QKD scheme was introduced by
Bennett and Brassard in 1984 (BB84 for short) [3]. An
unconditional security proof for the whole protocol has
been given in Ref. [4]. After the first demonstration of the
feasibility of this scheme [5], several long-distance imple-
mentations of QKD have been realized in the last years
(see, for instance, Ref. [6] and references therein). How-
ever, these practical approaches differ in many impor-
tant aspects from the original theoretical proposal, since
it demands technologies that are beyond our present ex-
perimental capability. Especially, the signals emitted by
the source, instead of being single-photons, are usually
weak coherent pulses (WCP) with typical average pho-
ton numbers of 0.1 or higher. This fact, together with
the considerable attenuation introduced by quantum the
channel and the noise introduced by the detectors, jeop-
ardize the security of the protocol and lead to limitations
of rate and distance that can be covered by these tech-
niques [7, 8]. A positive security proof against all indi-
vidual attacks, even with practical signals, has first been
given in Ref. [9], while a complete proof of the uncon-
ditional security of this scheme in a realistic setting has
been provided in Refs. [10, 11]. This means that, despite
practical restrictions, with the support of the classical in-
formation techniques (error correction and privacy am-
plification) used in the key distillation phase, it is still
possible to obtain a secure secret key.
The main security threat of QKD protocols based on
WCP arises from the fact that some signals contain more
than one photon prepared in the same polarization state.
Now, Eve can perform, for instance, the so-called Pho-
ton Number Splitting (PNS) attack on the multi-photon
pulses [7]. This attack provides Eve with full informa-
tion about the part of the key generated from the multi-
photon signals, without causing any disturbance in the
signal polarization. As a result, it turns out that the
BB84 protocol with WCP can give a key generation rate
of order O(η2), where η denotes the transmission effi-
ciency of the quantum channel [10, 11].
To obtain higher secure key rates over longer distances,
different QKD schemes, that are robust against the PNS
attack, have been proposed in recent years. One of these
schemes is the so-called decoy-states [12, 13], where Al-
ice varies at random the mean photon number of the
signal states sent to Bob by using different intensity set-
tings. This technique delivers a key generation rate of
order O(η) [12, 13]. Another possibility is based on the
transmission of two non-orthogonal coherent states to-
gether with a strong reference pulse [14]. This scheme
has been analyzed in detail in Ref. [15], where it was
confirmed that also in this scenario the secure key rate
is of order O(η). Finally, another possible approach
is to use a differential-phase-shift (DPS) QKD protocol
[16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21]. In this scheme Alice sends to
Bob a train of WCP whose phases are randomly mod-
ulated by 0 or π. On the receiving side, Bob measures
out each incoming signal by means of an interferome-
ter whose path-length difference is set equal to the time
difference between two consecutive pulses. In this last
case, however, a secure key rate of order O(η) has only
been proven so far against a special type of individual
attacks where Eve acts and measures photons individu-
ally, rather than signals [17], and also against a partic-
2ular class of collective attacks where Eve attaches an-
cillary systems to each pulse or to each pair of succes-
sive pulses [22]. While a complete security proof of DPS
QKD against the most general attack is still missing,
recently it has been shown that sequential attacks al-
ready impose strong restrictions on the performance of
this QKD scheme with WCP [17, 23, 24]. For instance,
it was proven in Refs. [23, 24] that the DPS QKD exper-
iments reported in Refs. [18, 19] are insecure against this
type of attacks. Basically, a sequential attack consists
of Eve measuring out every signal state emitted by Alice
and, afterwards, she prepares new signal states, depend-
ing on the results obtained, that are given to Bob. When-
ever Eve obtains a predetermined number of consecutive
successful measurement outcomes, then she prepares a
train of non-vacuum signal states that is forwarded to
Bob. Otherwise, Eve sends, for instance, vacuum signals
to Bob to avoid errors. Sequential attacks constitute a
special type of intercept-resend attacks [25, 26, 27] and,
therefore, they provide ultimate upper bounds on the
performance of QKD schemes [28].
In discussions within the scientific community one of-
ten hears, however, that the security analysis presented
in Refs. [23, 24] might have overestimated the strength
that sequential attacks have against a DPS QKD proto-
col. This conjecture is justified because the sequential
attacks studied so far in the literature have not consid-
ered the effect of Bob’s detectors dead-time. As a result,
the probability that each non-vacuum signal state, within
a train of them, sent by Eve contributes to the sifted key
does not depend on whether the previous signal states
in the train already produced a click on Bob’s detection
apparatus or not. This suggests that such analysis might
overestimate the number of Bob’s detected events that
originates from the non-vacuum signal states sent by Eve
and, therefore, it might deliver shorter secure distances.
The aim of this paper is to investigate limitations im-
posed by Bob’s detectors dead-time on the performance
of sequential attacks against a DPS QKD protocol [29].
For that, we shall analyze sequential attacks based on
unambiguous state discrimination (USD) of the signal
states emitted by Alice [23, 24, 25, 30, 31]. When Eve
identifies unambiguously a signal state, then she consid-
ers this result as successful. Otherwise, she considers it a
failure. We shall consider two possible scenarios for our
analysis. The first one, so-called untrusted device sce-
nario, arises from a conservative definition of security,
i.e., we shall assume that Eve can control some imper-
fections in Alice and Bob’s devices (e.g., the detection
efficiency, the dark count probability, and the dead-time
of Bob’s detectors), together with the losses in the quan-
tum channel, and she exploits them to obtain maximal
information about the shared key. In the second scenario,
so-called trusted device scenario, we shall consider that
Eve cannot modify the actual detection devices employed
by Alice and Bob. That is, the legitimate users have com-
plete knowledge about their detectors, which are fixed
by the actual experiment. The main motivation to study
FIG. 1: Basic setup of a DPS QKD scheme. PM denotes a
phase modulator, BS, a 50 : 50 beam splitter, M, a mirror,
D0 and D1 are two photon detectors and ∆t represents the
time difference between two consecutive pulses.
this scenario is that, from a practical point of view, it
constitutes a reasonable description of a realistic situa-
tion, where Alice and Bob can limit Eve’s influence on
their apparatus by some counterattack techniques [32].
A different QKD scheme, but also related to a DPS
QKD protocol, has been proposed recently in Ref. [33].
(See also Ref. [34].) However, since the abstract signal
structure of this protocol is different from the one of a
DPS QKD scheme, the analysis contained in this pa-
per does not apply to that scenario. Sequential attacks
against the QKD protocol introduced in Ref. [33] have
been investigated in Ref. [35], while its security against a
particular class of collective attacks has been studied in
Ref. [22].
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we de-
scribe in more detail a DPS QKD protocol. Then, in
Sec. III, we present sequential attacks against this QKD
scheme. Section IV includes the analysis for the un-
trusted device scenario. Here we obtain an upper bound
on the maximal distance achievable by a DPS QKD pro-
tocol as a function of the error rate in the sifted key,
the mean photon-number of Alice’s signal states and the
dead-time of Bob’s detectors. Similar results are de-
rived in Sec. V, now for the trusted device scenario. Fi-
nally, Sec. VI concludes the paper with a summary. The
manuscript includes as well several appendices with ad-
ditional calculations.
II. DIFFERENTIAL-PHASE-SHIFT (DPS) QKD
The setup is illustrated in Fig. 1 [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21].
Alice prepares first a train of coherent states |α〉 and, af-
terwards, she modulates, at random and independently
every time, the phase of each pulse to be 0 or π. As a
result, she produces a random train of signal states |α〉 or
| − α〉 that are sent to Bob through the quantum chan-
nel. On the receiving side, Bob uses a 50 : 50 beam split-
ter to divide the incoming pulses into two possible paths
and then he recombines then again using another 50 : 50
beam splitter. The time delay introduced by Bob’s inter-
ferometer is set equal to the time difference ∆t between
two pulses. Whenever the relative phase between two
consecutive signals is 0 (±π) only the photon detector
3D0 (D1) may produce a “click” (at least one photon is
detected). For each detected event, Bob records the time
slot where he obtained a click and the actual detector
that fired.
Once the quantum communication phase is completed,
Bob uses a classical authenticated channel to announce
the time slots where he obtained a click, but he does not
reveal which detector fired each time. From this informa-
tion provided by Bob, together with the knowledge of the
phase value used to modulate each pulse, Alice might in-
fer which photon detector had clicked at Bob’s side each
given time. Then, Alice and Bob can agree, for instance,
to select a bit value “0” whenever the photon detector
D0 fired, and a bit value “1” if the detector D1 clicked.
In an ideal scenario, Alice and Bob end up with an iden-
tical string of bits representing the sifted key. Due to the
noise introduced by the quantum channel, together with
possible imperfections of Alice and Bob’s devices, how-
ever, the sifted key typically contains some errors. Then,
Alice and Bob perform error-correction to reconcile the
data and privacy amplification to decouple the data from
Eve. (See, for instance, Ref. [1].)
III. SEQUENTIAL ATTACKS AGAINST DPS
QKD
A sequential attack can be seen as a special type of
intercept-resend attack [17, 23, 24]. First, Eve measures
out every coherent state emitted by Alice with a detection
apparatus located very close to the sender. Afterwards,
she transmits each measurement result through a lossless
classical channel to a source close to Bob. Whenever Eve
considers a sequence of measurement outcomes success-
ful, this source prepares a new train of signal states that
is forwarded to Bob. Otherwise, Eve typically sends vac-
uum signals to Bob to avoid errors. Whether a sequence
of measurement results is considered to be successful or
not, and which type of non-vacuum signal states Eve
sends to Bob, depends on Eve’s particular eavesdropping
strategy and on her measurement device. Sequential at-
tacks transform the original quantum channel between
Alice and Bob into an entanglement breaking channel
[36] and, therefore, they do not allow the distribution
of quantum correlations needed to establish a secret key
[28].
Let us begin by introducing Eve’s measurement appa-
ratus. As mentioned previously, we shall consider that
Eve realizes USD [30, 31] of each signal state sent by
Alice. That is, whenever she obtains a conclusive result
then it is guaranteed that the result is always correct.
In order to do that, we will assume that Eve has always
access to a local oscillator that is phase-locked to the co-
herent light source employed by Alice [37]. Whenever Eve
identifies unambiguously a predetermined number of con-
secutive signal states, i.e., she determines without error
whether each signal state is |α〉 or | − α〉, she considers
this sequence of measurement outcomes successful. Oth-
erwise she considers it a failure [38]. We define the integer
parameter Mmin as the minimum number of consecutive
USD successful results that Eve needs to obtain in order
to consider the sequence of measurement outcomes suc-
cessful. More precisely, if k ≥ 0 denotes the total number
of consecutive USD successful outcomes obtained by Eve
before she obtains an inconclusive result, then, whenever
k > Mmin, Eve prepares a new train of signal states, that
we shall denote as ρke , together with some vacuum states
for the inconclusive result, and she sends these signals to
Bob. The precise definition of the quantum state ρke will
be introduced later on, since it will depend on whether
we consider the untrusted or the trusted device scenario,
respectively. The reason to append some vacuum states
to each train of signal states ρke is also closely related to
the eavesdropping strategy of these two possible cases.
The main idea behind this procedure is to guarantee that
whenever Bob obtains a click on his detection apparatus
then he cannot obtain any other click afterwards during
a period of time at least equal to the dead-time of his
detectors. That is, these vacuum states sent by Eve will
allow her to reproduce the dead-time of Bob’s detectors,
whose influence on the security evaluation of a DPS QKD
protocol is the main focus of this paper. For simplicity,
let us assume for the moment that Eve sends to Bob
1 + d vacuum states together with each train of signal
states ρke in order to achieve this goal, while the precise
value of the parameter d will be given for the untrusted
(trusted) device scenario in Sec. IV (Sec. V). On the
other hand, if k < Mmin Eve sends to Bob k+1 vacuum
states, where the last vacuum state corresponds to Eve’s
inconclusive result. The case k = Mmin deserves special
attention. We shall consider that in this situation Eve
employs a probabilistic strategy that combines the two
previous ones. In particular, we assume that Eve sends to
Bob the signal state ρMmine , together with 1 + d vacuum
states, with probability q and, with probability 1−q, she
sends to Bob Mmin + 1 vacuum states. That is, the pa-
rameter q allows Eve to smoothly fit her eavesdropping
strategy to the observed data [23]. Moreover, in order to
simplify our calculations, we define the integer parameter
Mmax > Mmin as the maximum number of consecutive
USD successful results that Eve can obtain in order to
send to Bob a train of signal states. That is, whenever
Eve obtains Mmax consecutive USD successful outcomes
then she discards the next measurement outcome and di-
rectly sends to Bob the quantum state ρMmaxe together
with 1+ d vacuum states for the discarded measurement
result.
Let p denote the probability that Eve obtains an USD
successful result per signal state sent by Alice. It has the
following form [30]
p = 1− |〈α| − α〉| = 1− exp (−2µα), (1)
where µα represents the mean photon-number of Alice’s
signal states, i.e., µα = |α|2.
We shall denote with ps(k) the probability that Eve
sends to Bob a train of signal states ρke , together with
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FIG. 2: Possible signal states that Eve sends to Bob together
with their a priori probabilities. The arrow indicates the
transmission direction.
1 + d vacuum states. This probability can be written as
ps(k) =


qpMmin(1− p) if k =Mmin
pk(1 − p) if Mmin < k < Mmax
pMmax if k =Mmax
0 otherwise,
(2)
with p given by Eq. (1). Similarly, we shall denote with
pv(k) the probability that Eve sends to Bob k+1 vacuum
states. This probability is given by
pv(k) =


pk(1 − p) if 0 ≤ k < Mmin
(1− q)pMmin(1 − p) if k =Mmin
0 otherwise.
(3)
We illustrate all these possible cases in Fig. 2, where we
also include the different a priori probabilities to be in
each of these scenarios.
Next we analyze in detail the influence that Bob’s de-
tectors dead-time has on the performance of the sequen-
tial attack introduced above. The goal is to find an ex-
pression for the gain, i.e., the probability that Bob ob-
tains a click per signal state sent by Alice, together with
the quantum bit error rate (QBER) introduced by Eve,
in both the untrusted and the trusted device scenarios,
respectively.
IV. UNTRUSTED DEVICE SCENARIO
Here we shall consider that Eve can always control
some imperfections in Alice and Bob’s devices together
with the quantum channel. Especially, we shall assume
that Eve can always replace Bob’s imperfect detection
apparatus by an ideal one in order to exploit its detec-
tion efficiency, together with the dark count probability
and the dead-time of his detectors, to obtain maximal in-
formation about the shared key. Of course, to guarantee
that Eve’s presence remains unnoticeable to the legiti-
mate users, Eve needs to send Bob signal states that can
reproduce the statistics that Alice and Bob expect after
their measurements. For this, we shall consider the stan-
dard version of a DPS QKD protocol, where Alice and
Bob only monitor the raw bit rate (before the key distil-
lation phase) together with the time instances in which
Bob obtains a click.
The main limitation on the type of signal states that
Eve can send to Bob in this scenario arises from the dead-
time of Bob’s detectors. In order to simplify our analysis
we shall assume that both detectors D0 and D1 in Fig. 1
are indistinguishable, i.e., their dark count rate, quan-
tum efficiency and dead-time, are equal. Moreover, we
shall consider a conservative scenario where every time
that one of these detectors clicks, then both detectors do
not respond to any other incident photon during a period
of time equal to the dead-time, i.e., we shall assume that
after a click both detectors suffer simultaneously from
a dead time. This is a key assumption underlying the
whole analysis presented in this paper. In the exper-
imental setup employed in Refs. [18, 19, 20, 21] both
detectors D0 and D1 are connected to the same Time
Interval Analyser (TIA) that also has a dead-time which
is typically much higher than the dead-time of the de-
tectors. Whenever one of these detectors clicks then the
TIA does not respond to any other click event during a
period of time equal to its dead-time. In this situation,
however, if D0 and D1 do not suffer simultaneously from
a dead-time, then the effect of the TIA can be understood
as just blocking some of the output signals coming from
the two detectors. As a result, the raw key obtained by
Alice and Bob could contain correlations between differ-
ent bits which might be known to some extend to Eve.
For instance, if one detector clicks, and the clock fre-
quency of the system is high enough, then, because of its
dead-time, it is more probable that the next click comes
from the other detector. This last scenario is beyond the
scope of this paper and the analysis will be presented
somewhere else.
In the sequential attack introduced in Sec. III, Eve
sends to Bob only two possible classes of signal states: a
state ρke followed by 1 + d vacuum states, or a train of
k + 1 vacuum signals. This means, in particular, that
Bob can only obtain clicks in his detection apparatus
when he receives a signal state ρke . To be able to mimic
the dead-time of Bob’s detectors, therefore, Eve needs to
select each state ρke such that it can produce only one
click on Bob’s side within a dead-time period. For that,
Eve chooses ρke containing only one photon distributed
among k temporal modes. These modes correspond to
k consecutive pulses sent by Alice, i.e., the time differ-
ence between two consecutive temporal modes in ρke is set
equal to the time difference ∆t between two consecutive
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FIG. 3: Labeling convention for the k temporal modes of the
signal state |ψk〉 given by Eq. (4) followed by 1 + d vacuum
states. The arrow indicates the transmission direction.
pulses sent by Alice. More precisely, we shall consider
that ρke denotes a pure state |ψke 〉 (i.e., ρke = |ψke 〉〈ψke |)
given by
|ψke 〉 =
k∑
n=1
A(k)n exp (iθn)aˆ
†
n|0〉, (4)
with A
(k)
n ∈ C and where the normalization condition∑k
n=1 |A(k)n |2 = 1 is always satisfied. The angles θn ful-
fill θn = 0 if the signal state identified by Eve’s USD
measurement at the time instance n is |α〉 and θn = π
if the signal state identified by Eve is | − α〉, the opera-
tor aˆ†n represents a creation operator for one photon in
temporal mode n, and the state |0〉 refers to the vacuum
state. Eq. (4) considers the possibility of using different
amplitudes A
(k)
n for the resent signals, following the spirit
of Ref. [24]. The superscript k labeling the coefficients
A
(k)
n emphasizes the fact that the value of these coeffi-
cients may depend on the number of temporal modes k
contained in |ψke 〉. Moreover, from now on we will use
the convention that the first temporal mode of |ψke 〉 that
arrives at Bob’s detection device is mode n = k, while
the last one is mode n = 1. This labeling convention is
illustrated in Fig. 3.
Let us now determine the minimum number, 1 + d,
of vacuum states that Eve needs to send to Bob after
each signal state |ψke 〉. From the previous paragraph we
learn that whenever Bob receives a state |ψke 〉 satisfying
Eq. (4) then he obtains one single click in his detection
device. This click can occur, however, in any temporal
mode n, with n ∈ [0, k] [39]. The minimum value of the
parameter d can be calculated from the case where Bob
obtains a click in the last possible temporal mode, i.e.,
n = 0 (see Fig. 3). Let us assume that such a click occurs,
and let td and fc denote, respectively, the dead-time of
Bob’s detectors and the clock frequency of the system. To
guarantee that Bob cannot obtain any other click from a
following signal state until td finishes we find that d has
to fulfill d ≥ ⌈tdfc⌉. That is, the parameter d has to be
larger than or equal to the number of signal states sent
by Alice within a period of time equal to the dead-time.
From now on we shall consider that Eve selects d such
that
d = ⌈tdfc⌉. (5)
Next, we obtain an expression for the gain and for the
QBER introduced by Eve in this scenario.
A. Gain
The gain, that we shall denote as G, of a sequential
attack is defined as the probability that Bob obtains a
click per signal state sent by Alice. It can be expressed
as G = Nclicks/N , where Nclicks represents the average
total number of clicks obtained by Bob, and N is the
total number of signal states sent by Alice. The parame-
ter Nclicks can be expressed as Nclicks = (N/N
e)Neclicks,
with Ne denoting the average total number of pulses of
signal states sent by Eve (see Fig. 2), and where Neclicks
represents the average total number of clicks obtained by
Bob when Eve sends to him precisely these signal states.
With this notation, the gain of a sequential attack can
be written as
G =
Neclicks
Ne
. (6)
Next, we obtain an expression for Neclicks and N
e. Let
us begin with Neclicks. Whenever Eve sends to Bob a
signal state |ψke 〉 followed by 1 + d vacuum states (Cases
A, B, and C in Fig. 2) Bob always obtains one click in his
detection apparatus. On the other hand, if Eve sends to
Bob only vacuum states (Cases D and E in Fig. 2) Bob
never obtains a click. This means, in particular, that
Neclicks can be expressed as
Neclicks =
Mmax∑
k=Mmin
ps(k), (7)
with ps(k) given by Eq. (2). This expression can be fur-
ther simplified as
Neclicks =
[
q + (1− q)p]pMmin . (8)
The analysis to obtain Ne is similar. A signal state
|ψke 〉 followed by 1+ d vacuum states can be seen as con-
taining k+1+ d pulses. On the other hand, the number
of vacuum pulses alone that Eve sends to Bob can vary
from 1 to Mmin + 1 (see Fig. 2). Adding all these terms
together, and taking into account their a priori probabil-
ities, we obtain that Ne can be written as
Ne =
Mmax∑
k=0
pv(k)(k + 1) + ps(k)(k + 1 + d), (9)
with pv(k) given by Eq. (3). This expression can be sim-
plified as
Ne =
d
[
q + (1 − 2q)p− (1− q)p2]pMmin − pMmax+1 + 1
1− p
(10)
The gain G can be related with a transmission distance
l for a given QKD scheme, i.e., a distance which provides
6an expected click rate at Bob’s side given by G. This last
condition can be written as
G = 1− exp (−µαηdetηt), (11)
where ηdet represents the detection efficiency of the detec-
tors employed by Bob, and ηt denotes the transmittivity
of the quantum channel. In the case of a DPS QKD
scheme, the value of ηt can be derived from the loss co-
efficient γ of the optical fiber measured in dB/km, the
transmission distance l measured in km, and the loss in
Bob’s interferometer L measured in dB as
ηt = 10
−γl+L10 . (12)
From Eq. (11) and Eq. (12), we find that the transmission
distance l that provides a gain G is given by
l = − 1
γ
[
L+ 10 log10
(− ln (1−G)
µαηdet
)]
. (13)
B. Quantum bit error rate
The QBER, that we shall denote as Q, is defined
as Q = Nerrors/Nclicks, where Nerrors represents the
average total number of errors obtained by Bob, and
Nclicks is again the average total number of clicks at
Bob’s side. The parameter Nerrors can be expressed as
Nerrors = (N/N
e)Neerrors, with N
e
errors denoting the av-
erage total number of errors obtained by Bob when Eve
sends him the different signal states considered in her
strategy (see Fig. 2). With this notation, and using again
the fact that Nclicks = (N/N
e)Neclicks, we obtain that the
QBER of a sequential attack can be expressed as
Q =
Neerrors
Neclicks
. (14)
The parameter Neclicks was calculated in the previous sec-
tion and it is given by Eq. (8). Let us now obtain an ex-
pression for Neerrors. We shall distinguish the same cases
like in the previous section, depending on the type of sig-
nal states that Eve sends to Bob. Whenever Eve sends to
Bob a signal state |ψke 〉 followed by 1 + d vacuum states
(Cases A, B, and C in Fig. 2) then we shall denote the av-
erage total number of errors in this scenario as e(k). On
the other hand, if Eve sends to Bob only vacuum states
(Cases D and E in Fig. 2) Bob never obtains an error.
This means, in particular, that Neerrors can be expressed
as
Neerrors =
Mmax∑
k=Mmin
ps(k)e(k). (15)
The parameters e(k), with Mmin ≤ k ≤ Mmax, can be
obtained from the signal states |ψke 〉, together with the
detection device used by Bob. They are calculated in
Appendix A and are given by
e(k) =
1
4
[
|A(k)1 |2 +
k−1∑
n=1
|A(k)n+1 −A(k)n |2 + |A(k)k |2
]
. (16)
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FIG. 4: Gain (G) versus QBER in a sequential attack for
three different distributions of the state coefficients A
(k)
n : flat
(solid), binomial (dashed), and the optimal distribution (dot-
ted). The mean photon number of Alice’s signal states is
µα = 0.2, and the parameter d = 500. The triangles repre-
sent experimental data from Ref. [21].
C. Evaluation
We have seen above that a sequential attack can be
parametrized by the minimum number Mmin of consec-
utive USD successful results that Eve needs to obtain in
order to consider the sequence of measurement outcomes
successful, the maximum number Mmax of consecutive
successful results that Eve can obtain in order to send to
Bob a train of signal states, the value of the probability
q, i.e., the probability that Eve actually decides to send
to Bob the signal state |ψMmine 〉 followed by 1+d vacuum
states instead of Mmin + 1 vacuum states, and the state
coefficients A
(k)
n ∈ C that characterize the signal states
|ψke 〉, with Mmin ≤ k ≤Mmax.
Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7 show a graphical representation
of the Gain versus the QBER in this sequential attack for
different values of the mean photon-number µα of Alice’s
signal states, the parameter d, and the state coefficients
A
(k)
n . It states that no key distillation protocol can pro-
vide a secret key from the correlations established by the
users above the curves, i.e., the secret key rate in that re-
gion is zero. In these examples we consider three possible
distributions for A
(k)
n : the flat distribution, the binomial
distribution, and we also calculate the optimal distribu-
tion, i.e., the one which provides the lowest QBER for a
given value of the Gain. The corresponding state coeffi-
cients for these distributions are given by
Flat: A(k)n =
1√
k
, for all n ∈ [1, k],
Binomial: A(k)n =
(
1√
2
)k−1√(
k − 1
n− 1
)
, (17)
while the method to obtain the optimal distribution is de-
scribed in Appendix B. Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7 assume as
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FIG. 5: Gain (G) versus QBER in a sequential attack for
three different distributions of the state coefficients A
(k)
n : flat
(solid), binomial (dashed), and the optimal distribution (dot-
ted). The mean photon number of Alice’s signal states is
µα = 0.17, and the parameter d = 50. The triangles repre-
sent experimental data from Ref. [18]. (See also Ref. [20].)
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FIG. 6: Gain (G) versus QBER in a sequential attack for
three different distributions of the state coefficients A
(k)
n : flat
(solid), binomial (dashed), and the optimal distribution (dot-
ted). The mean photon number of Alice’s signal states is
µα = 0.16, and the parameter d = 50. The triangle repre-
sents experimental data from Ref. [18]. (See also Ref. [20].)
well thatMmax is fixed and given byMmax = 25, and we
vary the parameters Mmin < Mmax and q ∈ [0, 1]. They
also include experimental data from Refs. [18, 19, 20, 21].
For instance, in the experiment reported in Ref. [21] the
dead-time of Bob’s detectors is td = 50 ns and the clock
frequency of the system is fc = 10 GHz. From Eq. (5)
we obtain, therefore, that d = 500. (See Fig. 4.) Simi-
larly, in the experiments realized in Refs. [18, 19, 20] we
have that td = 50 ns and fc = 1 GHz. This means, in
particular, that in all these cases d = 50. (See Figs. 5,
6 and 7.) According to our results it seems that all the
long-distance implementations of DPS QKD reported in
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FIG. 7: Gain (G) versus QBER in a sequential attack for
three different distributions of the state coefficients A
(k)
n : flat
(solid), binomial (dashed), and the optimal distribution (dot-
ted). The mean photon number of Alice’s signal states is
µα = 0.2, and the parameter d = 50. The triangles represent
experimental data from Ref. [19]. (See also Ref. [20].)
Refs. [18, 19, 20, 21] would be insecure against a sequen-
tial attack in the untrusted device scenario. That is,
there exists no improved classical communication proto-
col or improved security analysis which might allow the
data of Refs. [18, 19, 20, 21] to be turned into secret key.
V. TRUSTED DEVICE SCENARIO
In this section we impose constraints on Eve’s capa-
bilities, and we are interested in the effect that these
constraints have on her eavesdropping strategy. In par-
ticular, we study the situation where Eve is not able to
manipulate Alice and Bob’s devices at all, but she is lim-
ited to act exclusively on the quantum channel (See, e.g.,
Refs. [25, 40]). That is, we shall consider that the detec-
tion efficiency, the dark count probability, and the dead-
time of Bob’s detectors are now fixed by the actual ex-
periment, and Eve cannot influence them to obtain extra
information about the shared key. The main motivation
to analyze this scenario is that, from a practical point of
view, it constitutes a reasonable description of a realistic
situation, where Alice and Bob could in principle limit
Eve’s influence on their apparatus by some counterattack
techniques [32]. Moreover, this could only enhance Alice
and Bob’s ability to distill a secret key.
The detection efficiency ηdet of Bob’s detectors typi-
cally satisfies ηdet < 1. Therefore, in this scenario, Eve
might be interested in sending Bob multi-photon signals,
instead of single-photon states like in Sec. IV, in order
to increase the gain. Moreover, as mentioned above, we
assume now that the dead-time of Bob’s detectors is al-
ready present in D0 and D1 and Eve does not need to
select her signal states such that they can reproduce it.
These two facts motivate the following definition for the
8signal states ρke in this case. In particular, we shall con-
sider that ρke consists of a classical mixture of pure states,
that we shall denote as |ψmk 〉, containing m ≥ 1 photons
that are distributed among k temporal modes, i.e.,
ρke =
∞∑
m=1
pm|ψmk 〉〈ψmk |, (18)
with the photon-number probabilities pm satisfying∑∞
m=1 pm = 1 [41]. The states |ψmk 〉 are defined as
|ψmk 〉 =
(
ψˆ†k,m
)m
√
m!
|0〉, (19)
with |0〉 representing the vacuum state, and where the
operators ψˆ†k,m are given by
ψˆ†k,m =
k∑
n=1
A(k)n,m exp (iθn)aˆ
†
n. (20)
As before, aˆ†n represents a creation operator for one pho-
ton in temporal mode n, and the coefficients A
(k)
n,m sat-
isfy the normalization condition
∑k
n=1 |A(k)n,m|2 = 1. The
superscript k and the subscript m labeling these coeffi-
cients are used to emphasize that the value of A
(k)
n,m may
depend, respectively, on the number of temporal modes
k, and on the number of photons m, contained in |ψmk 〉.
Moreover, like in Sec. IV, we shall consider that the time
difference between two consecutive temporal modes in
|ψmk 〉 is set equal to the time difference ∆t between two
consecutive pulses sent by Alice. The definition of θn in
Eq. (20) is also equal to the one provided for these angles
in Sec. IV. That is, θn = 0 if the signal state identified
by Eve’s USD measurement at the time instance n is |α〉,
and θn = π if the state identified by Eve is | − α〉. Be-
sides, since Eve does not need to choose an eavesdropping
strategy that reproduces Bob’s detectors dead-time, the
number of vacuum states that she sends to him following
each signal state ρke can be set equal to one, i.e., we will
assume that d = 0 in Fig. 2. This vacuum state corre-
sponds to the inconclusive result. Of course, Eve could
choose as well an eavesdropping strategy where the pa-
rameter d satisfies d > 0; this strategy would only cause
that the value of the gain decreases and, therefore, it
would also diminish the strength of Eve’s attack. Finally,
for simplicity, we shall consider that the parameterMmax
satisfies Mmax ≤ ⌈tdfc⌉. This condition guarantees that,
within each of the blocks of signal states illustrated in
Fig. 2, Bob can obtain, at most, only one click in his
detection apparatus.
Next, we obtain an expression for the gain and for
the QBER introduced by Eve in this scenario. We will
analyze as well the resulting double click rate at Bob’s
side in this eavesdropping strategy. Note that now the
double click rate obtained by Bob may increase due to
the multi-photon signals used by Eve.
A. Gain
As shown previously, in this sequential attack the gain
is given by Eq. (6). However, the analysis to obtain an ex-
pression for the parametersNeclicks andN
e is now slightly
different from the one considered in Sec. IV, where Bob’s
detectors dead-time was reproduced by the signal states
sent by Eve. In particular, now we need to include the
effect of the dead-time of Bob’s detectors in the detec-
tion model. Moreover, in this scenario Bob can obtain as
well double clicks in his detection apparatus. We shall
consider that these double click events are not discarded
by Bob, but they contribute to the raw key. Every time
Bob obtains a double click, he just decides randomly the
bit value [42].
Let us start by considering again the type of signal
states that Eve sends to Bob in this strategy. These
signals are illustrated in Fig. 2, where the states ρke are
given by Eq. (18) and the parameter d = 0. However,
once Bob’s detectors are recovered from a dead-time pro-
duced by a previous click, the first temporal mode that
arrives at Bob’s side at this time instant might not coin-
cide with the first temporal mode of any of the blocks of
signal states considered in Fig. 2. This first mode could
be, in principle, any of the temporal modes contained in
these blocks of signal states. For instance, it could be
any of the k temporal modes contained in ρke . Note that
this last case was never possible in the scenario analyzed
in Sec. IV. Figure 8 shows a graphical representation
of the possible blocks of signal states that can arrive at
Bob’s side after a dead-time. These blocks of signals are
just obtained from those illustrated in Fig. 2 by discard-
ing some of their first temporal modes. For example, the
block which contains only one vacuum state (Case A in
Fig. 8) could arise from every block of signals considered
in Fig. 2, just by discarding all their temporal modes ex-
cept the last one. The block composed by two vacuum
states (Case C in Fig. 8) could originate from any block
of signals in Fig. 2 that contains at least two vacuum
states at the end of the block (Cases D and E in Fig. 2
when d = 0), and so on. The a priori probabilities of
the different blocks of signals illustrated in Fig. 8, that
we shall denoted as q(k), r(k), and s(k), respectively,
are calculated in Appendix C. The superscript k¯, with
1 ≤ k¯ < Mmax, that labels the states ρk¯e in Fig. 8 is used
to emphasize the fact that these signals may correspond
to the last k¯ temporal modes of any signal state ρke with
k ≥ k¯.
The parameters Neclicks and N
e can now be expressed,
respectively, as
Neclicks =
∞∑
m=1
pmN
e
clicks(m), (21)
where Neclicks(m) denotes the average total number of
clicks obtained by Bob when he receives the different
blocks of signal states illustrated in Fig. 8 with ρk¯e be-
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FIG. 8: Possible signal states arriving at Bob’s detection ap-
paratus after a dead-time, together with their a priori proba-
bilities. The arrow indicates the transmission direction.
ing the last k¯ temporal modes of any state |ψmk 〉, and
Ne =
∞∑
m=1
pmN
e(m), (22)
with Ne(m) representing the average total number of
pulses caused by these blocks of signal states. That is, to
calculateNe(m) we need to consider not only the number
of temporal modes contained in the signals illustrated in
Fig. 8 but also the fact that whenever Bob obtains a click
in any of these modes then he cannot obtain any other
click during the following d˜ = ⌈tdfc⌉ pulses [43]. The
main idea behind the whole analysis contained in this
section is to study the behaviour of the possible blocks of
signals that Bob can receive from Eve after a dead-time,
together with their a priori probabilities. Every time a
dead-time finishes we have a new trial of this random
process.
Next, we calculate an expression for Neclicks(m) and
Ne(m). We shall distinguish several cases, depending
on the block of signal states that arrives at Bob’s side
after a dead-time. Let us begin with Case A in Fig. 8.
The probability that Bob obtains a click in this scenario
depends on the identity of the preceding signal. We shall
denote with pvv the probability to obtain a click when
the previous signal is also a vacuum state, and we shall
denote with pmvk the probability to obtain a click when the
previous signal is the state |ψmk 〉. These two probabilities
are calculated in Appendix D. In general, we have that
pvv > 0 due to the dark counts in Bob’s detectors. Let
ppv (ppk) denote the probability that the previous signal
is a vacuum state (the signal |ψmk 〉). These probabilities
are calculated in Appendix E. With this notation, we find
that the average total number of clicks in this scenario,
that we shall represent as Neclicks,q(0)(m), is given by
Neclicks,q(0)(m) = ppvpvv +
Mmax∑
k=Mmin
ppkp
m
vk. (23)
Next, we calculate an expression for the average total
number of pulses, that we shall denote as Neq(0)(m). This
parameter depends on whether Bob’s detectors click or
do not click. In particular, we have that whenever Bob
obtains a click in his detection apparatus then the total
number of pulses that we need to consider is 1+ d˜. That
is, in this case we need to include the effect of the dead-
time. Otherwise, the number of pulses is one. We obtain,
therefore, that
Neq(0)(m) = ppv[pvv(1 + d˜) + (1 − pvv)]
+
Mmax∑
k=Mmin
ppk[p
m
vk(1 + d˜) + (1− pmvk)]
= ppv(1 + d˜pvv) +
Mmax∑
k=Mmin
ppk(1 + d˜p
m
vk).
(24)
The analysis of the remaining cases included in Fig. 8 is
similar. Whenever Bob receives a block of k + 1 vacuum
states (Cases C and E in Fig. 8), with 1 ≤ k ≤Mmin, it
is guaranteed that the signal which precedes the block is
always a vacuum state. This is justified by the particular
structure of the different blocks of signal states that Eve
can send to Bob (see Fig. 2). In this case, due to the dead-
time of Bob’s detectors, Bob can only obtain a click in a
given temporal mode if the previous modes of the block
did not click. The average total number of clicks, that
we shall denote as Neclicks,q(k)(m), can then be expressed
as
Neclicks,q(k)(m) =
k∑
n=0
(1− pvv)npvv = 1− (1− pvv)k+1.
(25)
In order to calculate the average total number of pulses,
that we shall denote as Neq(k)(m), note that, like before,
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whenever Bob obtains a click in temporal mode l ∈ [0, k]
then the total number of pulses that we need to consider
is (k − l) + (1 + d˜). The first term in the summation,
(k − l), represents the total number of modes contained
in the block before the mode that actually clicked (see
the labeling convention illustrated in Fig. 3), while the
second term, (1 + d˜), includes the effect of the dead-
time. Otherwise, the number of pulses is k+1. We find,
therefore, that Neq(k)(m) can be written as
Neq(k)(m) = (k + 1)(1− pvv)k+1
+
k∑
n=0
(n+ 1 + d˜)(1 − pvv)npvv
=
(1 + d˜pvv)
[
1− (1− pvv)k+1
]
pvv
. (26)
When Bob receives a state ρk¯e , with 1 ≤ k¯ ≤Mmin−1, fol-
lowed by one vacuum state (Cases B, D, and F in Fig. 8),
then the state which precedes that block of signals can
never be a vacuum state. Let pk
k¯
denote the probability
that ρk¯e stems from the last k¯ temporal modes of a signal
state |ψmk 〉 with Mmin ≤ k ≤ Mmax, and let qmk¯ (k) be
the average total number of clicks obtained by Bob in this
scenario. The probability pk
k¯
is calculated in Appendix F,
while the parameter qm
k¯
(k) can be written as
qmk¯ (k) =
k¯∑
n=0
pmc,k¯,k(n), (27)
with pm
c,k¯,k
(n) denoting the probability that Bob obtains
a click in temporal mode n and he does not obtain a click
in any previous mode l with n < l ≤ k¯. This last quantity
is calculated in Appendix D. With this notation, we have
that the average total number of clicks in this case, that
we shall denote as Ne
clicks,r(k¯−1)
(m), can be expressed as
Neclicks,r(k¯−1)(m) =
Mmax∑
k=Mmin
pkk¯q
m
k¯ (k), (28)
Similarly, the average total number of pulses has now
the form
Ner(k¯−1)(m) =
Mmax∑
k=Mmin
pkk¯n
m
k¯ (k), (29)
where the parameter nm
k¯
(k) represents the average total
number of pulses when Bob receives the last k¯ temporal
modes of the signal |ψmk 〉 together with one vacuum state.
This parameter is given by
nmk¯ (k) =
k¯∑
n=0
pmc,k¯,k(n)[k¯ − n+ 1 + d˜]
+ [1− qmk¯ (k)](1 + k¯). (30)
Bob can receive as well a state ρk¯e , with Mmin ≤ k¯ ≤
Mmax, followed by one vacuum state (Cases G, H and I in
Fig. 8). Let ppvk¯ denote the probability that the preced-
ing signal is a vacuum state, and let pk
pk¯
be the probability
that ρk¯e stems from the last k¯ temporal modes of the sig-
nal state |ψmk 〉, with k¯ < k ≤Mmax. These two probabil-
ities are calculated in Appendix G. Using this notation,
we obtain that the average total number of clicks in this
scenario, that we shall denote as Ne
clicks,s(k¯−Mmin)
(m),
with Mmin ≤ k¯ ≤Mmax, can be expressed as
Neclicks,s(k¯−Mmin)(m) = ppvk¯q
m
k¯ (k¯) +
Mmax∑
k=k¯+1
pkpk¯q
m
k¯ (k),
(31)
while the average total number of pulses, that we shall
denote as Ne
s(k¯−Mmin)
(m), can directly be obtained from
Eq. (31) just by substituting the parameters qm
k¯
(k), with
k¯ ≤ k ≤Mmax, by nmk¯ (k).
Finally, Neclicks(m) and N
e(m) can be calculated by
adding all these terms together with their a priori prob-
abilities. That is,
Neclicks(m) =
Mmin∑
k=0
q(k)Neclicks,q(k)(m)
+
Mmin−2∑
k=0
r(k)Neclicks,r(k)(m)
+
Mmax−Mmin∑
k=0
s(k)Neclicks,s(k)(m), (32)
and similarly for Ne(m).
B. Quantum bit error rate
The QBER in this strategy is given by Eq. (14), with
the parameter Neclicks now given by Eq. (21). In order
to obtain Neerrors we follow the same method like in the
previous section. In particular, this quantity can now be
expressed as
Neerrors =
∞∑
m=1
pmN
e
errors(m), (33)
where Neerrors(m) denotes the average total number of
errors obtained by Bob when he receives from Eve the
different blocks of signal states illustrated in Fig. 8 with
ρk¯e representing the last k¯ temporal modes of any state
|ψmk 〉 with k ≥ k¯. Note, moreover, that in this scenario
vacuum states can also produce errors in Bob’s detection
apparatus due to the dark counts.
The analysis to obtain the parameter Neerrors(m) is
completely equivalent to the one included in Sec. VA
to calculate Neclicks(m); basically one only needs to sub-
stitute Bob’s probabilities to obtain a click pvv, p
m
vk,
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and pm
c,k¯,k
(n) by the probabilities to obtain an error in
precisely the same situations when these probabilities
were introduced. For instance, we need to substitute
pvv by the probability that Bob obtains an error when
he receives from Eve a vacuum state and the preced-
ing signal is also a vacuum state, and similar for the
other cases. These error probabilities, that we shall de-
note, respectively, as evv, e
m
vk, and p
m
e,k¯,k
(n) are calcu-
lated in Appendix H. The only exception is the pa-
rameter Neerrors,q(k)(m) (Cases C and E in Fig. 8), with
1 ≤ k ≤ Mmin. This exception only arises due to the
notation used in Sec. VA. Bob can obtain an error in a
given temporal mode n+ 1 if the previous modes of the
block did not clicked; that is, the probability to have an
error in that mode is (1−pvv)nevv. We obtain, therefore,
that Neerrors,q(k)(m) is now given by
Neerrors,q(k)(m) =
k∑
n=0
(1− pvv)nevv
= evv + evv
1− pvv
pvv
[
1− (1− pvv)k
]
.
(34)
C. Double click rate
So far we have considered the case of the standard DPS
QKD protocol, where only the raw bit rate, together with
the time slots in which Bob obtains a click, are moni-
tored. In this section, however, we briefly analyze the
case of an extended version of the protocol, where Alice
and Bob can also make use of the double click rate at
Bob’s side to try to detect Eve. That is, every time Bob
obtains a double click in his detection apparatus he first
records this event and, afterwards, he selects randomly
the bit value. This is motivated by the fact that, unlike
the type of signal states considered in Sec. IV, now the
states ρke given by Eq. (18) always present a non vanish-
ing probability of producing a double click. This means,
in particular, that Alice and Bob could employ this infor-
mation to discard those sequential attacks that increase
the double click rate that they expect due to the statis-
tical fluctuations in the channel, together with the effect
of dark counts in Bob’s detectors [44].
The double click rate at Bob’s side, that we shall de-
note as Dc, is typically defined as Dc = NDc/N , where
NDc refers to the average total number of double clicks
obtained by Bob, and N is again the total number of
signal states sent by Alice. NDc can be expressed as
NDc = (N/N
e)NeDc , with N
e given by Eq. (22) and
where NeDc denotes the average total number of double
clicks obtained by Bob when he receives from Eve the
different blocks of signals illustrated in Fig. 8. With this
notation, we find that Dc can be written as
Dc =
NeDc
Ne
. (35)
The parameter NeDc can be expressed as
NeDc =
∞∑
m=1
pmN
e
Dc(m), (36)
where NeDc(m) denotes the average total number of dou-
ble clicks obtained by Bob when the signal states ρk¯e il-
lustrated in Fig. 8 represent the last k¯ temporal modes
of any state |ψmk 〉.
Again, the analysis to obtain NeDc(m) is completely
equivalent to the one included in Sec. VA to calculate
Neclicks(m). We only need to substitute in Eq. (32) the
probabilities to obtain a click pvv, p
m
vk, and p
m
c,k¯,k
(n) by
the probabilities to obtain a double click in the same
situation. We shall denote these double click proba-
bilities as dcvv, dc
m
vk and p
m
dc,k¯,k
(n), and they are cal-
culated in Appendix I. The only exception is the pa-
rameter NeDc,q(k)(m) (Cases C and E in Fig. 8), with
1 ≤ k ≤ Mmin. The reason for this exception is simi-
lar to the one presented in Sec. VB for the parameter
Neerrors,q(k)(m). In particular, N
e
Dc,q(k)
(m) can be ob-
tained from Eq. (34) by substituting the probability evv
by dcvv.
D. Evaluation
In Figs. 9, 10, 11 and 12 we plot the gain G versus
the QBER in a sequential attack for different values of
the mean photon number µα of Alice’s signal states, the
parameter d˜, the dark count probability pd and the de-
tection efficiency ηdet of Bob’s detectors, and the photon
number m of Eve’s signal states [45]. These examples
illustrate the case of the standard DPS QKD protocol
where Alice and Bob do not monitor separately the dou-
ble click rate at Bob’s side and Eve can select the param-
eterm without any restriction on the maximum tolerable
double click rate. As before, these figures state that the
secret key rate above the curves is zero.
We fix the value of Mmax = d˜ and we vary the value
of the parameters Mmin < Mmax and q ∈ [0, 1] like in
Sec. IVC. Moreover, for simplicity, we select the state
coefficients A
(k)
n,m of the signal states ρke given by Eq. (18)
as A
(k)
n,m = A
(k)
n for all m ≥ 1, with A(k)n given by the
optimal distribution derived in Appendix B for the case
of the untrusted device scenario. It can be shown that
also in this case this distribution provides a lower QBER
than the one obtained with a flat or a binomial distribu-
tion. As expected, the QBER produced by a sequential
attack starts decreasing as the losses in the channel in-
crease, and, at some point, it begins to increase again.
This inflexion point is due to the dark count probability
of Bob’s detectors, which Eve cannot manipulate in the
trusted device scenario. In particular, when the gain is
low enough such that most of the clicks obtained by Bob
originate from the dark counts of his detectors then the
QBER starts increasing again. In the limit case where all
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FIG. 9: Gain (G) versus QBER in a sequential attack for
different values of the photon number m, and for the optimal
distribution of the state coefficients A
(k)
n,m derived in Sec. IV.
The mean photon number of Alice’s signal states is µα =
0.2, the parameter d˜ = 500, the dark count probability of
Bob’s detectors is pd = 2.5×10−9, and the detection efficiency
ηdet = 0.005. The triangles represent experimental data from
Ref. [21].
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FIG. 10: Gain (G) versus QBER in a sequential attack for
different values of the photon number m, and for the op-
timal distribution of the state coefficients A
(k)
n,m derived in
Sec. IV. The mean photon number of Alice’s signal states is
µα = 0.17, the parameter d˜ = 50, the dark count probability
of Bob’s detectors is pd = 7.8 × 10−6, and the detection ef-
ficiency ηdet = 0.0327. The triangle represents experimental
data from Ref. [18]. (See also Ref. [20].)
the detected events arise from dark counts we have that
the QBER=0.5. Figs. 9, 10, 11 and 12 also include exper-
imental data from Refs. [18, 19, 20, 21]. According to our
results, and for the values of the parameter m considered
in these examples, we find that the 200 km DPS QKD
experiment reported in Ref. [21] together with the 105
km DPS QKD experiment reported in Ref. [18] would be
insecure against a sequential attack even in the trusted
device scenario. That is, the data of these experiments
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FIG. 11: Gain (G) versus QBER in a sequential attack for
different values of the photon number m, and for the op-
timal distribution of the state coefficients A
(k)
n,m derived in
Sec. IV. The mean photon number of Alice’s signal states is
µα = 0.16, the parameter d˜ = 50, the dark count probability
of Bob’s detectors is pd = 2.7 × 10−7, and the detection ef-
ficiency ηdet = 0.0045. The triangle represents experimental
data from Ref. [18]. (See also Ref. [20].)
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FIG. 12: Gain (G) versus QBER in a sequential attack for
different values of the photon number m, and for the op-
timal distribution of the state coefficients A
(k)
n,m derived in
Sec. IV. The mean photon number of Alice’s signal states is
µα = 0.2, the parameter d˜ = 50, the dark count probability
of Bob’s detectors is pd = 3.5 × 10−8, and the detection ef-
ficiency ηdet = 0.0011. The triangles represent experimental
data from Ref. [19]. (See also Ref. [20].)
could never be turned into secret key.
As already suggested in Ref. [23], in this QKD protocol
it is not enough for Alice and Bob to include the effect of
the double clicks obtained by Bob in the QBER, but it
might be very useful for the legitimate users to monitor
also the double click rate to guarantee security against a
sequential attack. Fig. 13 shows a graphical representa-
tion of the gain versus the double click rate for the case
where µα = 0.17, d˜ = 50, pd = 7.8× 10−6, ηdet = 0.0327,
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FIG. 13: Gain (G) versus double click rate (Dc) in a sequential
attack for different values of the photon number m, and for
the optimal distribution of the state coefficients A
(k)
n,m derived
in Sec. IV. The experimental parameters coincide with those
used in Fig. 10.
and for different values of the parameter m [18]. (See
also Ref. [20].) Similar results can also be obtained for
the experimental parameters used in Refs. [19, 21]. As
expected, the double click rate at Bob’s side decreases as
the losses in the channel increases and the photon num-
ber m decreases. If Alice and Bob only accept a double
click rate below the curve which corresponds to the case
m = 1 then they could always detect the sequential at-
tacks presented in this section.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have quantitatively analyzed the ef-
fect that Bob’s detectors dead-time has on the perfor-
mance of sequential attacks against a differential-phase-
shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol
based on weak coherent pulses. A sequential attack con-
sists of Eve measuring out every coherent state emitted
by Alice and, afterwards, she prepares new signal states,
depending on the results obtained, that are given to Bob.
Whenever Eve obtains a predetermined number of con-
secutive successful measurement outcomes, then she pre-
pares a new train of non-vacuum signal states that is
forwarded to Bob. Otherwise, Eve can send vacuum sig-
nals to Bob to avoid errors. Sequential attacks transform
the original quantum channel between Alice and Bob into
an entanglement breaking channel and, therefore, they do
not allow the distribution of quantum correlations needed
to establish a secret key.
Specifically, we have studied sequential attacks where
Eve realizes unambiguous state discrimination of Alice’s
signal states. When Eve identifies unambiguously a sig-
nal state sent by Alice, then she considers this result
as successful. Otherwise, she considers it as a failure.
Moreover, we have considered two possible scenarios for
our analysis. In the first one, so-called untrusted device
scenario, we assumed that Eve can control some imper-
fections in Alice and Bob’s devices (e.g., the detection
efficiency, the dark count probability, and the dead-time
of Bob’s detectors), together with the quantum chan-
nel, and she exploits them to obtain maximal information
about the shared key. In the second scenario, so-called
trusted device scenario, we considered that Eve cannot
modify the actual detection devices employed by Alice
and Bob. That is, the legitimate users have complete
knowledge about their detectors, which are fixed by the
actual experiment. From a practical point of view, this
last case constitutes a reasonable description of a real-
istic situation, where Alice and Bob could in principle
try to limit Eve’s influence on their apparatus by some
counterattack techniques.
As a result, we obtained upper bounds on the maximal
distance achievable by a DPS QKD scheme as a function
of the error rate in the sifted key, and the detection effi-
ciency, the dark count probability, and the dead-time of
Bob’s detectors. It states that no key distillation protocol
can provide a secret key from the correlations established
by the users. While our analysis seems to indicate that in
the untrusted device scenario all the long-distance imple-
mentations of DPS QKD reported so far in the literature
would be insecure against a sequential attack, it also sug-
gests that, in the trusted device scenario, it might be very
useful for the legitimate users to monitor also the dou-
ble click rate at Bob’s side. This fact might dramatically
increase Alice and Bob’s ability in defeating sequential
attacks in this case.
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APPENDIX A: AVERAGE TOTAL NUMBER OF
ERRORS e(k)
In this appendix we obtain an expression for the av-
erage total number of errors e(k) obtained by Bob when
Eve sends him a signal state |ψke 〉 followed by 1 + d vac-
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uum states (Cases A, B, and C in Fig. 2). These signal
states always produce one single click in Bob’s detection
apparatus and, therefore, they can cause at most one
single error (i.e., e(k) ≤ 1). This error can occur in any
temporal mode n ∈ [0, k]. The parameter e(k) can be
written as
e(k) =
k∑
n=0
pk,nerr , (A1)
where pk,nerr denotes the probability that Bob obtains an
error in temporal mode n. Next, we calculate this prob-
ability.
We shall consider that Bob employs the detection setup
shown in Fig. 1. We will assume as well that his detec-
tors, D0 and D1, have a detection efficiency equal to
one, a dark count probability equal to zero, and they
cannot distinguish the number of photons of arrival sig-
nals. That is, they provide only two possible outcomes:
“click” (at least one photon is detected), and “no click”
(no photon is detected in the pulse). The action of D0
and D1 in the time slot n can be characterized by one
positive operator value measure (POVM) that contains
four elements: Dnvac, D
n
0 , D
n
1 , and D
n
Dc. The outcome
of the first operator Dnvac corresponds to no click in the
detectors, the following POVM operator Dn0 (D
n
1 ) gives
precisely one detection click in detectorD0 (D1), and the
last one DnDc gives rise to both detectors being triggered.
If we denote by |p, q〉nD0,D1 the state that, in temporal
mode n, contains p photons in the spatial mode arriv-
ing to detector D0 and q photons in the spatial mode
corresponding to detector D1, then the elements of this
POVM can be expressed as
Dnvac = |0, 0〉〈0, 0|nD0,D1
Dn0 =
∞∑
p=1
|p, 0〉〈p, 0|nD0,D1
Dn1 =
∞∑
p=1
|0, p〉〈0, p|nD0,D1
DnDc =
∞∑
p,q=1
|p, q〉〈p, q|nD0,D1 (A2)
Once the state |ψke 〉 followed by 1 + d vacuum states
passes Bob’s interferometer, the signal that arrives at
Bob’s detectors, that we shall denote as |ψ˜ke 〉, is given by
|ψ˜ke 〉 =
k∑
n=1
B(k)n
[
aˆ†n,D0 − aˆ†n,D1 + aˆ†n−1,D0 + aˆ†n−1,D1
]|0〉
(A3)
followed by d vacuum states. The coefficients B
(k)
n in
Eq. (A3) are given by B
(k)
n = [A
(k)
n exp (iθn)]/2, and
aˆ†n,D0 (aˆ
†
n,D1) represents a creation operator for one pho-
ton in temporal mode n and in the spatial mode corre-
sponding to detector D0 (D1).
It turns out that the probability pk,nerr remains constant
independently of the different possible combinations of
correct phases θn identified by Eve. Therefore, without
loss of generality, we can assume a fixed value for the
angles θn. In particular, we shall consider, for instance,
that θn = 0 for all n ∈ [1, k] and, consequently, B(k)n =
A
(k)
n /2. In this scenario an error occurs when detector
D1 clicks. The probability pk,nerr can then be expressed as
pk,nerr = Tr(D
n
1 |ψ˜ke 〉〈ψ˜ke |), with |ψ˜ke 〉 given by Eq. (A3). As
a result, we obtain
pk,kerr =
1
4
|A(k)k |2
pk,0<n<kerr =
1
4
|A(k)n+1 −A(k)n |2
pk,0err =
1
4
|A(k)1 |2. (A4)
Adding all these terms together according to Eq. (A1)
we finally obtain
e(k) =
1
4
[
|A(k)1 |2 +
k−1∑
n=1
|A(k)n+1 −A(k)n |2 + |A(k)k |2
]
. (A5)
APPENDIX B: OPTIMIZATION OF A
(k)
n
In this appendix we describe a method to optimize the
state coefficients A
(k)
n introduced in Eq. (4) for the un-
trusted device scenario. As shown in Sec. IVA, in this
case the overall gain G is independent of the chosen dis-
tribution for these coefficients. This means that the min-
imum value of the QBER can be attained by optimizing
the average total number of errors e(k) independently of
G.
The coefficients A
(k)
n ∈ C satisfy the normalization
condition
∑k
n=1 |A(k)n |2 = 1. In polar coordinates
each of these coefficients can be expressed as A
(k)
n =
a
(k)
n exp(iψ
(k)
n ), with a
(k)
n , and ψ
(k)
n ∈ R. With this nota-
tion, the terms |A(k)n+1 −A(k)n |2 in Eq. (16) simplify to
|A(k)n+1 − A(k)n |2 = (a(k)n+1)2 + (a(k)n )2
− 2a(k)n a(k)n+1 cos(ψ(k)n+1 − ψ(k)n )
≥ (a(k)n+1 − a(k)n )2, (B1)
where equality is obtained iff ψ
(k)
n+1−ψ(k)n is an even mul-
tiple of π, i.e., both A
(k)
n+1 and A
(k)
n have the same phase.
Then, without loss of generality, we can always impose
the phases ψ
(k)
n , with n ∈ [1, k], to be equal to zero. With
this constraint, together with the normalization condi-
tion of the state coefficients, one can further simplify the
parameters e(k) as
e(k) =
1
2
(
1−
k−1∑
n=1
a
(k)
n+1a
(k)
n
)
. (B2)
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Now, in order to minimize this quantity one can equiva-
lently solve the following optimization problem,
minimize c
k∑
n=1
(a(k)n )
2 −
k−1∑
n=1
a
(k)
n+1a
(k)
n
subject to
k∑
n=1
(a(k)n )
2 = 1, (B3)
where c > 0 is an arbitrary positive constant. This opti-
mization problem can be written in matrix form as
minimize‖~ak‖=1f(~ak) = ~akM(c)~a
T
k , (B4)
where the vector ~ak is defined as ~ak = (a
(k)
1 , . . . , a
(k)
k ),
and the matrix M(c) = c1 − K/2 with K = KT being
a k × k matrix with ones only on the first off-diagonals
and zeros elsewhere, i.e.,
K =


0 1 0 . . .
1 0 1 . . .
0 1 0 . . .
...
...
...
. . .

 . (B5)
The Hessian matrix of the function f(~ak) is M(c); hence
if one selects the constant c such that M(c) > 0 then the
resulting optimization problem is convex, and it suffices
to find a local minimum. The solution is given by
minimize‖~ak‖=1f(~ak) = c−maximize‖~ak‖=1~akK~ak
= c− λmax(K), (B6)
where λmax(K) denotes the maximal eigenvalue of the
matrix K. The optimal solution for the state coefficients
A
(k)
n coincides then with the elements of the normal-
ized eigenvector of K that is associated with its maximal
eigenvalue.
Fig. 14 shows a graphical representation of e(k) versus
k for the optimal distribution of A
(k)
n together with the
flat and the binomial distributions given in Eq. (17).
APPENDIX C: PROBABILITIES q(k), r(k) AND
s(k)
In this appendix we provide the expressions for the
a priori probabilities of the blocks of signal states illus-
trated in Fig. 8: q(k), r(k) and s(k). As already ex-
plained in Sec. V, these blocks of signal states arise due
to the effect of the dead-time of Bob’s detectors. In par-
ticular, in the trusted device scenario it is not guaranteed
that the first temporal mode that arrives at Bob’s side
once his detectors are recovered from a dead-time coin-
cides with the first temporal mode of any of the blocks
of signals considered in Fig. 2. In this scenario, and for a
given block of signals containing k+1 modes (see Fig. 2),
we shall denote with pd(n) the probability that the first
 0
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FIG. 14: The average total number of errors e(k) versus k
for different distributions of the state coefficients A
(k)
n : flat
(solid), binomial (dashed), and the optimal distribution (dot-
ted).
temporal mode of the block that arrives at Bob’s side af-
ter a dead-time is mode k − n. That is, pd(n) represents
the probability that a dead-time finishes once Bob has
already received the first n temporal modes of a given
block of signals. For instance, pd(0) represents the prob-
ability that the first mode that arrives at Bob’s side after
a dead-time coincides with the first temporal mode of the
block, pd(1) denotes the probability that the first mode
arriving at Bob’s side corresponds to the second tempo-
ral mode of the block, and so on. Here we use again the
labeling convention illustrated in Fig. 3.
With this notation, let us now calculate the parame-
ter q(0), i.e., the probability that Bob receives a vacuum
state after a dead-time (Case A in Fig. 8). In princi-
ple, this vacuum state could originate from the last tem-
poral mode of every block of signal states illustrated in
Fig. 2 with d = 0. For instance, the probability that it
originates from the block of signals which contains only
one vacuum state (Case D in Fig. 2 when the parame-
ter k = 0) is given by pd(0)pv(0), where pv(0) is given by
Eq. (3). In general, we have that the probability that this
vacuum state arises from a block of signals which contains
k + 1 vacuum states, with 0 ≤ k ≤ Mmin (Cases D and
E in Fig. 2), is given by pd(k)pv(k)/[
∑Mmin
m=n−k pv(m) +∑Mmax
m′=Mmin
ps(m
′)], where the normalization factor∑Mmin
m=n−k pv(m)+
∑Mmax
m′=Mmin
ps(m
′) is used to guarantee
that, for each value of the parameter pd(n), the probabil-
ities of the different blocks of signal states which contain
at least n + 1 temporal modes add one. Similarly, we
find that the probability that this vacuum state origi-
nates from a block of signals containing a state ρke fol-
lowed by one vacuum state, with Mmin ≤ k ≤ Mmax
(Cases A, B, and C in Fig. 2 with d = 0), can be written
as pd(k)ps(k)/{
∑Mmax
m=k [pv(m) + ps(m)]}. After adding
all these terms together, we obtain that q(0) can be ex-
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pressed as
q(0) =
Mmin∑
n=0
pd(n)pv(n)
1−∑n−1m=0 pv(m)
+
Mmax∑
k=Mmin
pd(k)ps(k)∑Mmax
m=k
[
pv(m) + ps(m)
] (C1)
The analysis of the remaining cases is completely anal-
ogous. In particular, we find that
q(k) =
Mmin∑
n=k
pd(n− k)pv(n)
1−∑n−1−km=0 pv(m) , (C2)
with 1 ≤ k ≤Mmin,
r(k) =
Mmax∑
n=Mmin
pd(n− 1− k)ps(n)∑Mmax
m=n−1−k
[
pv(m) + ps(m)
] , (C3)
with 0 ≤ k ≤Mmin − 2, and
s(k) =
Mmax∑
n=Mmin+k
pd(n−Mmin − k)ps(n)∑Mmax
m=n−Mmin−k
[
pv(m) + ps(m)
] ,
(C4)
with 0 ≤ k ≤Mmax −Mmin.
To conclude, let us present very briefly a numeri-
cal method to calculate the probabilities pd(n), with
0 ≤ n ≤ Mmax. This procedure is used in Sec. VD
for the graphical representation of the gain G versus the
QBER (and also of the double click rate versus G) in
a sequential attack. For simplicity, let us consider the
situation where Mmax = ⌈tdfc⌉. That is, each block of
signal states illustrated in Fig. 8 could produce, at most,
only one single click in Bob’s detectors due to the effect
of the dead-time. In this scenario, the probabilities pd(n)
only depend on whether the previousMmax+1 temporal
modes which precede a block of signals clicked or did not
click. Especifically, we have that pd(0) is given by the
probability that none of these Mmax + 1 previous modes
clicked or it only clicked the first of them. That is,
pd(0) = G+ (1 −G)Mmax+1. (C5)
Similarly, pd(n), with 1 ≤ n ≤ Mmax, can be expressed
as
pd(n) = G(1−G)n. (C6)
Then, in order to obtain pd(n) an plot the figures in-
cluded in Sec. VD, we perform several iterations for each
value of the gain G. First, we calculate the probabilities
pd(n) according to Eq. (C5) and Eq. (C6) and, with these
probabilities, we obtain a new value for the gain G. We
repeat this procedure several times until the value of G
converges to a constant value.
APPENDIX D: PROBABILITIES pvv, p
m
vk AND
pm
c,k¯,k
(n)
In this appendix we obtain an expression for the prob-
abilities of obtaining a click at Bob’s side: pvv, p
m
vk and
pm
c,k¯,k
(n), introduced in Sec. VA.
Let us start by describing Bob’s detectors D0 and D1
in the trusted device scenario. As already introduced in
Sec. V, these detectors are characterized by their detec-
tion efficiency ηdet, their dark count probability pd, and
their dead-time. The detection efficiency of D0 and D1
can be modeled by a combination of beam splitters of
transmittance ηdet and ideal detectors [46]. This model
can be simplified further by considering that both detec-
tors have the same detection efficiency. In this situation,
it is possible to attribute the losses of both detectors
to a single-loss beam splitter which is located after the
transmission channel. Moreover, like in Sec. IV, we shall
assume that D0 and D1 cannot distinguish the number
of photons of arrival signals, but they provide only as
possible outcomes “click” and “no click”. This means, in
particular, that the action of Bob’s ideal detectors can be
characterized by the POVM given by Eq. (A2). Further-
more, the noise introduced by D0 and D1 due to their
dark counts can be considered to be independent of the
incoming signals. Note that the clicks that Bob observes
can be thought as coming from a two-step process: in the
first step the signal states sent by Eve can produce clicks
in his detectors, while in the second step random clicks
from the detector’s dark counts is added.
Next, we calculate an expression for the probability
pm
c,k¯,k
(n). For that, we obtain first the probability that
Bob’s detectors fire due to the signal states sent by Eve
only, i.e., without taking into account the dark counts
of D0 and D1; afterwards we will include in the analysis
the effect of the dark counts of the detectors.
Once a state |ψmk 〉, followed by one vacuum state,
passes Bob’s interferometer together with the beam split-
ter which models the losses of his detectors, the signal
that arrives at Bob’s ideal detectors, that we shall de-
note as |ψ˜mk 〉, is given by
|ψ˜mk 〉 =
1√
m!
[ k∑
n=0
(Emn aˆ
†
n,D1+F
m
n aˆ
†
n,D0)+
k∑
n=1
Gmn bˆ
†
n
]m
|0〉,
(D1)
where aˆ†n,D0 (aˆ
†
n,D1) represents again a creation opera-
tor for one photon in temporal mode n and in the spatial
mode arriving to detector D0 (D1), bˆ†n denotes a creation
operator for one photon in temporal mode n and in the
spatial mode that goes out of the beam splitter that mod-
els the losses of the detectors, and the coefficients Emn ,
Fmn , and G
m
n are given by
Emn =


ηA
(k)
1,me
iθ1 if n = 0
η[A
(k)
n+1,me
iθn+1 −A(k)n,meiθn ] if 1 ≤ n ≤ k − 1
−ηA(k)k,meiθk if n = k,
(D2)
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with η =
√
ηdet/2,
Fmn =


ηA
(k)
1,me
iθ1 if n = 0
η[A
(k)
n+1,me
iθn+1 +A
(k)
n,meiθn ] if 1 ≤ n ≤ k − 1
ηA
(k)
k,me
iθk if n = k,
(D3)
and
Gmn =
√
1− ηdetA(k)n,meiθn , (D4)
respectively.
Let pm,s
c,k¯,k
(n) denote the probability that Bob obtains
a click in mode n, with 0 ≤ n ≤ k¯, and he does not
obtain a click in any previous temporal mode l, with
n < l ≤ k¯, when he receives the last k¯ temporal modes of
a signal state |ψmk 〉 followed by one vacuum state. This
probability can be expressed as
pm,s
c,k¯,k
(n) = pmk¯,k,D0(n) + p
m
k¯,k,D1(n) + p
m
k¯,k,DDc
(n), (D5)
where pm
k¯,k,D0
(n) (pm
k¯,k,D1
(n)) represents the probability
that only detector D0 (D1) clicks in temporal mode n,
and pm
k¯,k,DDc
(n) denotes the probability that both detec-
tors D0 and D1 click in temporal mode n [47]. These
probabilities are given by
pmk¯,k,Di(n) = Tr
( k¯⊗
l=n+1
Dlvac ⊗Dni |ψ˜mk 〉〈ψ˜mk |
)
, (D6)
where the POVM elements Dlvac and D
n
i , with i ∈
{0, 1, Dc}, are given by Eq. (A2). After some calcula-
tions, we obtain that these probabilities can be written,
respectively, as
pmk¯,k,D0(n) =
∑
P3k+1
r=0
r/∈I0
tr=m
t(k+n+1)≥1
m!∏3k+1
l=0
l/∈I0
tl!
k∏
i=0
i/∈[n,k¯]
|Emi |2ti
×
k∏
j=0
j /∈[n+1,k¯]
|Fmj |2t(j+k+1)
k∏
s=1
|Gms |2t(s+2k+1) ,
pmk¯,k,D1(n) =
∑
P3k+1
r=0
r/∈I1
tr=m
tn≥1
m!∏3k+1
l=0
l/∈I1
tl!
k∏
i=0
i/∈[n+1,k¯]
|Emi |2ti
×
k∏
j=0
j /∈[n,k¯]
|Fmj |2t(j+k+1)
k∏
s=1
|Gms |2t(s+2k+1) ,
pmk¯,k,DDc(n) =
∑
P3k+1
r=0
r/∈IDc
tr=m
t(k+n+1)≥1
tn≥1
m!∏3k+1
l=0
l/∈IDc
tl!
k∏
i=0
i/∈[n+1,k¯]
[|Emi |ti
× |Fmi |t(i+k+1)
]2 k∏
s=1
|Gms |2t(s+2k+1) , (D7)
where the sets of indexes I0, I1 and IDc are given by: I0 =
[n, k¯]∪[n+k+2, k¯+k+1], I1 = [n+1, k¯]∪[n+k+1, k¯+k+1]
and IDc = [n + 1, k¯] ∪ [n + k + 2, k¯ + k + 1]. It turns
out that the probability pm,s
c,k¯,k
(n) remains invariable in-
dependently of the different possible combinations of cor-
rect consecutive phases θn identified by Eve. Therefore,
without loss of generality, we can always assume a fixed
value for the angles θn; for instance, we can consider that
θn = 0 for all n ∈ [1, k]. This means, in particular, that
the parameters Emn , F
m
n and G
m
n that appear in Eq. (D7)
depend only on the state coefficients A
(k)
n,m and the de-
tection efficiency of Bob’s detectors.
In order to include the effect of the dark counts of D0
and D1 in the analysis, let us define the parameter Pd as
Pd = pd(2− pd). (D8)
This is the probability to have a click at Bob’s side in
a given time slot due to the dark counts of his detectors
only. As already mentioned in Sec. VA, here we consider
that double click events are not discarded by Bob. Every
time Bob obtains a double click, he just decides randomly
the bit value [42]. With this notation, it turns out that
the probability that Bob obtains a click in temporal mode
n, with 0 ≤ n ≤ k¯, and he does not obtain a click in any
previous mode l, with n < l ≤ k¯, due to the dark counts
of his detectors only, probability that we shall denote as
pm,d
c,k¯
(n), is given by
pm,d
c,k¯
(n) = Pd(1− Pd)k¯−n. (D9)
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Combining Eq. (D5) and Eq. (D9), we obtain that the
probability pm
c,k¯,k
(n) can be expressed as
pmc,k¯,k(n) = p
m,s
c,k¯,k
(n)(1 − Pd)k¯−n+1 + pm,dc,k¯ (n) (D10)
× pmk¯,k,Dvac(n) + p
m,s
c,k¯,k
(n)pm,d
c,k¯
(n)
= pm,s
c,k¯,k
(n)(1 − Pd)k¯−n + pm,dc,k¯ (n)pmk¯,k,Dvac(n),
where pm
k¯,k,Dvac
(n) is given by Eq. (D6) with Di = Dvac,
i.e., it represents the probability that Bob does not ob-
tain a click in any temporal mode l, with n ≤ l ≤ k¯, due
to the signals sent by Eve only. This probability can be
written as
pmk¯,k,Dvac (n) =
∑
P3k+1
r=0
r/∈Ivac
tr=m
m!∏3k+1
l=0
l/∈Ivac
tl!
k∏
i=0
i/∈[n,k¯]
[|Emi |ti
× |Fmi |t(i+k+1)
]2 k∏
s=1
|Gms |2t(s+2k+1) , (D11)
with the set Ivac = [n, k¯] ∪ [n+ k + 1, k¯ + k + 1].
Finally, we obtain an expression for the probabilities
pvv and p
m
vk. The first one, pvv, represents the probability
that Bob obtains a click when he receives a vacuum state
and the preceding signal is also a vacuum state. This
probability has the form pvv = Pd, where Pd is given
by Eq. (D8). Similarly, pmvk denotes the probability that
Bob obtains a click when he receives a vacuum state and
the preceding signal is the state |ψmk 〉. This probability
is given by pmvk = p
m
c,0,k(0), where p
m
c,k¯,k
(n) is defined in
Eq. (D10).
APPENDIX E: PROBABILITIES ppv AND ppk
In this appendix we obtain an expression for the prob-
abilities ppv and ppk. Let us begin with ppv, i.e., the
probability that the signal which precedes a vacuum state
(Case A in Fig. 8) is also a vacuum state.
As shown in Appendix C, after a dead-time Bob
receives a vacuum state with a probability given by
Eq. (C1). The first summation in Eq. (C1) refers to
the probability that this vacuum state originates from
a block of signal states containing only vacuum pulses
(Cases D and E in Fig. 2). We have, therefore, that ppv
can be written as
ppv =
1
q(0)
Mmin∑
n=0
pd(n)pv(n)
1−∑n−1m=0 pv(m) , (E1)
where the normalization factor q(0) is used to guaran-
tee that ppv +
∑Mmax
Mmin
ppk = 1. Similarly, each term
pd(k)ps(k)/
∑Mmax
m=k
[
pv(m) + ps(m)
]
that appears in the
second summation of Eq. (C1) represents the probability
that Bob receives a vacuum state preceded by a signal
|ψmk 〉 (Cases A, B and C in Fig. 2 when the number of
photons contained in ρke is equal tom). After normalizing
by the factor q(0) we find that ppk is given by
ppk =
pd(k)ps(k)
q(0)
∑Mmax
m=k
[
pv(m) + ps(m)
] , (E2)
with Mmin ≤ k ≤Mmax.
APPENDIX F: PROBABILITY pk
k¯
In this appendix we calculate the probability pk
k¯
with
1 ≤ k¯ ≤Mmin−1, i.e., the probability that ρk¯e represents
the last k¯ temporal modes of a signal state |ψmk 〉 with
Mmin ≤ k ≤Mmax (Cases B, D, and F in Fig. 8).
As shown in Appendix C, after a dead-time Bob
receives the signal ρk¯e followed by one vacuum state
with probability r(k¯ − 1), where the probability r(k)
is given by Eq. (C3). Each term pd(n − 1 −
l)ps(n)/
∑Mmax
m=n−1−l[pv(m) + ps(m)] that appears in the
summation of Eq. (C3) denotes the probability that Bob
receives a state ρl+1e which corresponds to the last l + 1
temporal modes of a signal |ψmn 〉. After substituting
l + 1 = k¯ and n = k, and normalizing by the factor
r(k¯ − 1) we find that pk
k¯
is given by
pkk¯ =
pd(k − k¯)ps(k)
r(k¯ − 1)∑Mmaxm=k−k¯[pv(m) + ps(m)] . (F1)
APPENDIX G: PROBABILITIES ppvk¯ AND p
k
pk¯
In this appendix we obtain an expression for the prob-
abilities ppvk¯ and p
k
pk¯
, i.e., the probability that the signal
state ρk¯e received by Bob, with Mmin ≤ k¯ ≤ Mmax, is
preceded by a vacuum state, and the probability that
ρk¯e represents the last k¯ temporal modes of |ψmk 〉, with
k¯ < k ≤Mmax, respectively (Cases G, H and I in Fig. 8).
As shown in Appendix C, after a dead-time Bob re-
ceives the signal state ρk¯e with a probability given by
Eq. (C4). This probability can be equivalently written
as
s(k¯ −Mmin) =
Mmax∑
n=k¯
pd(n− k¯)ps(n)∑Mmax
m=n−k¯
[
pv(m) + ps(m)
] , (G1)
with Mmin ≤ k¯ ≤ Mmax. The first term in the sum-
mation given by Eq. (G1), i.e, the case n = k¯, refers to
the probability that Bob receives a state ρk¯e = |ψmk¯ 〉〈ψmk¯ |.
Because of the particular structure of the blocks of signal
states that Eve can send to Bob (see Fig. 2), these states
are always preceded by a vacuum state. After normaliz-
ing by the factor s(k¯ −Mmin) we obtain, therefore, that
ppvk¯ is given by
ppvk¯ =
pd(0)ps(k¯)
s(k¯ −Mmin)
. (G2)
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Similarly, each term pd(n − k¯)ps(n)/
∑Mmax
m=n−k¯[pv(m) +
ps(m)] that appears in Eq. (G1), with k¯ < n ≤ Mmax,
represents the probability that Bob receives a state ρk¯e
which originates from the signal state |ψmn 〉. We find,
therefore, that
pkpk¯ =
pd(k − k¯)ps(k)
s(k¯ −Mmin)
∑Mmax
n=k−k¯[pv(n) + ps(n)]
. (G3)
The normalization factor s(k¯ − Mmin) included in
Eq. (G2) and in Eq. (G3) guarantees that ppvk¯ +∑Mmax
k=k¯+1 p
k
pk¯
= 1.
APPENDIX H: PROBABILITIES evv, e
m
vk AND
pm
e,k¯,k
(n)
In this appendix we obtain an expression for the er-
ror probabilities evv, e
m
vk, and p
m
e,k¯,k
(n) introduced in
Sec. VB.
Let us start with the parameter evv, i.e., the probabil-
ity that Bob obtains an error when he receives from Eve
a vacuum state and the preceding signal is also a vacuum
state. This quantity is given by evv = pd(1− pd) + p2d/2,
where pd denotes the dark count probability of Bob’s de-
tectors. This quantity can be further simplified as
evv =
1
2
Pd, (H1)
with Pd given by Eq. (D8).
The parameter pm
e,k¯,k
(n), i.e., the probability that Bob
obtains an error in temporal mode n and he does not ob-
tain a click in any previous temporal mode l, with n < l ≤
k¯, when he receives the last k¯ temporal modes of the sig-
nal |ψmk 〉 followed by one vacuum state can be calculated
as the probability that Bob obtains a click in the “wrong”
detector and no click in the “correct” one, together with
one half the probability that he obtains a double click.
Like in Sec. IVB, the total error probability in this strat-
egy remains invariant independently of the different pos-
sible combinations of correct phases θn identified by Eve.
For simplicity, therefore, we can consider again that all
these phases are equal to zero. This means, in particular,
that in this situation the “wrong” detector corresponds
to detector D1. The probability pm
e,k¯,k
(n) can then be
expressed as pm
e,k¯,k
(n) = [pm
k¯,k,D1
(n) + pm
k¯,k,DDc
(n)/2](1−
Pd)
k¯−n+1+pm
k¯,k,Dvac
(n)(1−Pd)k¯−nPd/2+[pmk¯,k,D1(n)/2+
pm
k¯,k,DDc
(n)/2](1 − Pd)k¯−npd(1 − pd) + [pmk¯,k,D0(n)/2 +
pm
k¯,k,DDc
(n)/2 + pm
k¯,k,D1
(n)](1 − Pd)k¯−npd(1 − pd) +
[pm
k¯,k,D0
(n) + pm
k¯,k,D1
(n) + pm
k¯,k,DDc
(n)](1 − Pd)k¯−np2d/2,
where the parameters pm
k¯,k,D0
(n), pm
k¯,k,D1
(n) and
pm
k¯,k,DDc
(n) are given by Eq. (D7), and pm
k¯,k,Dvac
(n) is
given by Eq. (D11). This quantity can be further simpli-
fied as
pme,k¯,k(n) = (1− Pd)k¯−n
[(
1− pd
2
)
pmk¯,k,D1(n)
+
pdp
m
k¯,k,D0
(n)
2
+
pm
k¯,k,DDc
(n)
2
+ pd
(
1− pd
2
)
pmk¯,k,Dvac (n)
]
. (H2)
Similarly, the parameter emvk, i.e., the probability that
Bob obtains an error when he receives a vacuum state
and the preceding signal is the state |ψmk 〉 has the form
emvk = p
m
e,0,k(0), with p
m
e,k¯,k
(n) given by Eq. (H2).
APPENDIX I: PROBABILITIES dcvv, dc
m
vk AND
pmdc,k¯,k(n)
In this appendix we obtain an expression for the double
click probabilities dcvv, dc
m
vk and p
m
dc,k¯,k
(n) introduced in
Sec. VC.
The probability dcvv, i.e., the probability that Bob ob-
tains a double click when he receives from Eve a vacuum
state and the preceding signal is also a vacuum state is
given by
dcvv = p
2
d, (I1)
where pd denotes again the dark count probability of
Bob’s detectors.
The parameter pm
dc,k¯,k
(n), i.e., the probability that Bob
obtains a double click in temporal mode n and he does
not obtain a click in any previous temporal mode l, with
n < l ≤ k¯, when he receives the last k¯ temporal modes of
the signal |ψmk 〉 followed by one vacuum state is given by
pm
dc,k¯,k
(n) = pm
k¯,k,DDc
(n)(1− Pd)k¯−n+1 + pmk¯,k,Dvac(n)(1−
Pd)
k¯−np2d + [p
m
k¯,k,D1
(n) + pm
k¯,k,DDc
(n)](1 − Pd)k¯−npd(1 −
pd) + [p
m
k¯,k,D0
(n) + pm
k¯,k,DDc
(n)](1 − Pd)k¯−npd(1 − pd) +
[pm
k¯,k,D0
(n)+pm
k¯,k,D1
(n)+pm
k¯,k,DDc
(n)](1−Pd)k¯−np2d. This
quantity can be further simplified as
pmdc,k¯,k(n) = (1− Pd)k¯−n
{
pd
[
pmk¯,k,D1(n) + p
m
k¯,k,D0(n)
]
+ pmk¯,k,DDc(n) + p
2
dp
m
k¯,k,Dvac
(n)
}
. (I2)
Finally, the parameter dcmvk, i.e., the probability that
Bob obtains a double click when he receives a vacuum
state and the preceding signal is the state |ψmk 〉 has the
form dcmvk = p
m
dc,0,k(0), with p
m
dc,k¯,k
(n) given by Eq. (I2).
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